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Abstract: This study is an analysis of how terrorist organizations finance their operations, 
specifically through criminal activity. Financial models of terrorist organizations are the life of 
terrorist organizations and determine how successful groups are in executing terrorist attacks. 
The fact that terrorists are engaging in criminal activity presents a number of problems to the 
United States when establishing policy and counterterrorism efforts to combat terrorism. To what 
extent are these organizations relying on illicit activity as a method of funding and recruitment 
and what problems does that present to the United States when it comes to establishing policy 
and counterterrorism efforts to terrorism? This study reviews otherwise legal and illicit ways that 
terrorist organizations fund their operations to see which methods are most beneficial and more 
useful to their operations. Analysis of Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Hamas and their engagement in 
criminal activities as a main source of funding show that terrorist organizations rely heavily and 
mostly on illicit activities for the majority of their funding and sustainability. U.S. policy that 
encourages a U.S. whole of government approach is necessary to tackle terrorist financing. 
 U.S. policy has established that tracking terrorist finances is a priority for the United 
States Government (USG), but the different roles and opinions of U.S. government agencies and 
resources available to them are obstacles that the USG must overcome to fight terrorist financing. 
Luke-warm U.S. policies with minimal guidance to certain agencies does not help the U.S. 
Government work closely together to address organizational differences and form a strong 
approach when implementing counterterrorism efforts. Further analysis suggests that 
policymakers and leaders of agencies within the USG should work together to address these 
issues. This study provides an in-depth assessment of current obstacles the United States faces as 
a result of criminally financed terrorism, while also articulating how the USG can address gaps 





approach to combating terrorist financing.   
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 Terrorist financing is the fuel that provides terrorist organizations with the resources 
needed to carry out acts of terrorism. After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on U.S. soil, 
the United States established more policies and programs to fight terrorism. The United States 
found that organizations needed money to execute their operations and saw the need to aim 
counterterrorism efforts at terrorist financing as a way to track organizations and to cut off the 
flow of funds in hopes of tearing terrorist organizations down by disrupting operations by 
harming their financial models. This study evaluates in depth, the problems terrorist financing 
presents to U.S. counterterrorism efforts by evaluating how terrorist organizations finance their 
operations, both legitimately and illicitly. Evaluating specific instances where organizations the 
United States sees as a threat have used specific illicit activities to fund their operations, and 
taking a closer look at the internal issues that must be overcome by the U.S. Government to 
implement an effective whole-of-government approach to fight terrorist financing is important to 
disrupt terrorist financing. It is vital to U.S. national security efforts to see if and how terrorist 
organizations are financing their operations through illicit activity and to review current U.S. 
counterterrorism efforts and policy in place regarding terrorist financing. To address the problem 
of terrorist financing, a U.S. whole-of-government approach that overcomes internal obstacles 
and the current state of terrorism must be implemented to effectively fight terrorism. Ideally, a 
strong whole-of-government approach would allow each agency to work together and benefit 
from each other's strengths, while sharing resources and an overall mission. 
 Terrorist organizations that present threats to the United States are able to be successful in 
carrying out their operations by having strong and diversified financial mechanisms in place to 





to finance their operations and carry out acts of violence against the United States and others. 
This presents many problems to the United States in establishing and executing counterterrorism 
efforts. In the last decade, there has been a distinct decrease in terrorist organizations using legal 
business ventures to raise money and an increase of their use of criminal activity as a main 
resource of fundraising.
1 Most likely organizations have moved to this method, because funding 
through illegal activity allows for faster hard-cash flow, and is much harder to trace.
2  
 
Chapter 1: Overview of Terrorist Funding & Funding Methods 
 This study looks at disparate groups, methods, and processes that terrorist organizations 
have used to be successfully fund their operations. It is important to this study to review the 
different methods to better understand how these methods have evolved and  better grasp the 
challenges the United States faces when implementing policy and counterterrorism efforts to stop 
terrorist financing. Chapter one looks at various organizations that conduct terrorism and reviews 
many methods including state sponsorship, various criminal activity, and legitimate processes 
such as the traditional funds transfer process (Hawalla) that are and have been used to finance 
terrorist organizations and operations. To better comprehend the level of dependency terrorist 
organizations have on criminal activity, this study takes a closer look at how reliable major 
groups that present threats to the United States are on licit and illicit forms of funding. This can 
best be seen through researching the methods these organizations use to finance their operations, 
including the criminal activities they engage in that  and to what extent they rely on criminal 
activity for funding.  
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Chapter 2: A Look at Terrorist Financing Through Criminal Activity: Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, 
Hamas 
 Chapter 2 looks closer at the dependency terrorist organizations have on criminal activity 
for funding. There are a number of benefits that contribute significantly to the reason why 
terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Hamas use crime as a means of funding 
their operations. However, the most glaring fact revealed by looking at the three groups, is that 
terrorist organizations prefer gaining funds through crime because it is more difficult for their 
financial patterns and operations to be traced when they use illicit activities to earn funds. 
Although all of these organizations have mixed methods for funding case studies reveal that Al 
Qaeda and its affiliates, Hezbollah, and Hamas are engaged heavily in criminal activity as a main 
resource of funding. This presents a problem as crime provides hard and quick cash flow that is 
easy to hide and move, making the challenge to stop terrorist financing more difficult for the 
U.S. government. 
 
Chapter 3: Overcoming Obstacles: The Need to Establish A Whole-Of-Government Approach 
 Terrorist financing through criminal activity, presents obstacles that U.S. policymakers 
and agencies tasked with protecting U.S. interests from terrorist need to overcome to cut off  
terrorist financing. Although there are many policies and efforts in place to combat terrorism 
through monitoring and preventing the flow of funds linked to terrorism and terrorist 
organizations, there are discrepancies within current policy and within different government 
agencies, and departments that must be addressed for the United States to collectively fight 
terrorist financing. One major hurdle exposed in this study is that the U.S. government needs to 





ensure the government agrees to a shared mission to counter the problem. Policymakers and 
officials must also address organizational cultural differences and the lack of resources and 
support agencies have access to within the U.S. government when they are being tasked with 
slowing down and preventing terrorist financing. Analyzing the issues U.S. agencies and 
policymakers face provides guidance on how and where the United States government should 
focus efforts and resources to combat terrorist criminal activity and financing. 
 This study will ultimately expose the dangers that illicit terrorist funding poses to the 
United States and U.S. interests, and assist in providing policy recommendations and guidance 
on how the United States should approach making changes to current policy and counterterrorism 
efforts. This study will also prove valuable when it comes to establishing supportive policy, 
dedicating resources, and defining roles and responsibilities in a whole of government approach 
that will allow the United States to combat terrorism through eliminating terrorism by cutting off 















Chapter 1: Overview of Terrorist Funding 
 Terrorist organizations are very creative when it comes to funding their operations. Major 
organizations have been known to use both legitimate business ventures as well as illicit 
activities to gain profit to run operations and carry out acts of violence. In the last decade, there 
has been a decrease in terrorist organizations using legal business ventures to raise money and an 
increase of their use of criminal activity as a main resource of fundraising.
1
 For example, 
organizations such as Al Qaeda and the Haqqani Network have progressively moved from the 
use of legitimate businesses to gain profit to the use of various criminal activity, a favorite 
method being kidnapping.
2  Funding through illegal activity has become an ideal method for 
terrorist organizations to use as it allows for faster hard-cash flow, making it easier for terrorist 
organizations to transport and use the funding.
3
 
 Gaining a stronger perspective and understanding of how specific terrorist organizations 
fund their activities and gain resources is pertinent to see how prevalent terrorist criminal activity 
has become a tool to gain resources and carry out goals and actions. Evaluating the economic 
patterns and trends that major terrorist organizations have been known to use will paint a clearer 
picture of how terrorist networks are increasingly becoming more dependent on criminal activity 
to raise funds for their operations and how terrorist criminal activity raises overall concerns for 
American national security. 
 The focus of this chapter will expose how different terrorist organizations fund their 
networks, whether that is through legal or illegal methods. Although some policy and legislation 
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to mitigate terrorist funding will be introduced in the chapter, it will be addressed in depth in the 
third chapter of the thesis. This chapter's purpose is solely to get an idea of how terrorist 
organizations fund their networks and operations and set up their financial models, which will 
reveal how many terrorist organizations have turned to the use of criminal activity as a method of 
funding their networks and operations. 
 Understanding terrorist financing and how it relates to criminal activity is vital to 
establishing counterterrorism policies. To delve in deeper and evaluate how terrorist 
organizations use criminal activity as a tool to gain resources and recruit members, this study 
will focus on several terrorist organizations' funding and financial patterns. Additionally, the 
research will review how different terrorist organizations have funded themselves in the past and 
the present using different methods. Grasping a better perspective of trends within terrorists 
organizations' funding patterns, will assist in answering the overarching question: Should 
policymakers and national security officials focus counterterrorism efforts toward stopping 
terrorist criminal activity as a way of limitation to resources, networking, and recruitment? 
 There are many groups that are considered to be terrorist organizations. Some of these 
terrorist organizations are small and politically or ideologically motivated, while others are large 
insurgent groups, all motivated by different end-goals. When deciphering economic patterns of 
terrorist organizations, it is important to understand and identify the different organizations and 
networks as they all vary in capability, size, motive, and end-goals. The differences among 
groups considered to be terrorist organizations can influence where funding sources come from 
and spending behavior of each organization.
4
 
 Counterterrorism efforts have shifted after September 11, 2001, to focus on how terrorist 
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organizations fund their networks and operations. Interrupting the flow of revenue will help 
disrupt operations. But unfortunately, a vast majority of organizations are trained well and have 
become very skillful at hiding and moving their resources, which in turn makes it difficult to 
identify and see a clear picture of their financial patterns.
5  United States law enforcement 
officials say that tracking terrorist funds is extremely difficult.
6 However, by evaluating collected 
information and investigating various resources and research on what has been gathered on the 
topic of terrorist funding, it is easier to compare and analyze patterns to better understand and see 
just how terrorist organizations are using criminal activity. Additionally, this information and 
research will reveal what challenges that bring to securing national security against the terrorist 
threat. 
 
Methods of Terrorist Funding 
 Many studies conducted to evaluate trends of terrorist funding can trace economic 
patterns on a timeline beginning from the Cold War to the present. Funding patterns from the 
1960s and 1970s show that most terrorist organizations received the majority of their funds from 
state-sponsored funding as most organizations around that time had political goals and ties to 
their home-state. After the Cold War, terrorist activity expanded. Terrorist organizations began 




 Trends show that in the 1990s following the conclusion of the Cold War, state sponsor 
funding decreased and self-sufficient funding increased, which included the rise of criminal 
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activity as a means of income.
8 State-sponsored funding of terrorism has allowed terrorism to 
thrive following the Cold War and terrorist organizations have been able to become more 
independent without state funding and support
9 State funding was a popular source of funding 
during the Cold War because governments could use guerilla and revolutionary groups covertly 
to achieve goals of the state. These groups enjoyed the supply of money and other resources 
from the state. Sometimes the state's goals were not in the best interest of foreign relations so 
these groups provided a way for the government to achieve goals through unpopular means. If 
caught, the state could often deny they offered support to these groups. Examples of state 
sponsored terrorism include the group of individuals who took Americans hostage in Iran in 
1979. These individuals thought to be a revolutionary group of Iranian students, were actually 
found to have the support of Ayatollah Khomeini and his regime. The same individuals were also 
found to be behind other acts of terrorism. It is likely that many terrorist organizations that are 
now thought to independently use different methods and business ventures, would not have had 
enough support without the state to survive and maintain themselves. Many scholars suggest that 
terrorist organizations heavily prevalent today, are able to be more diverse when it comes to 
gaining profit due to the rapid expansion of globalization, "the development of an increasingly 
integrated global economy marked especially by free trade, free flow of capital, and the tapping 
of cheaper foreign labor markets."
10 Terrorist organizations "enjoy many advantages of 
globalization,
11
"by allowing the opportunities for terrorist organizations to be involved in 
international business ventures, both licit and illicit and to be creative in how they gain profit to 
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maintain their networks and for operations. With the expansion of globalization also came many 
failed states that various organizations could hide behind to delve into criminal activity as a way 




Terrorist Organizations & Terrorism 
 Reviewing how specific terrorist organizations fund their networks and operations will 
reveal that terrorist organizations are reverting to criminal activity to fund their organizations. By 
evaluating these specific terrorist organizations, it is clear that terrorist organizations heavily 
benefit from mixing criminal activity with legal methods of funding to sustain operations and 
strengthen their networks. According to Title 22 of U.S. Code, Section 2656f(d), a terrorist group 
is defined by "any group practicing, or which has significant subgroups which practice 
international terrorism."
13
 The groups addressed in this study, have all partaken in terrorism and 
the players involved in earning and contributing funds are to be held accountable for terrorism 




The Haqqani Network 
 In 2012, the United States designated the Haqqani Network as a terrorist organization.
15
 
The Haqqanis are a semi-autonomous network within the Taliban, connected to the State of 
Pakistan and it is thought they have ties to Al Qaeda. The Haqqani Network is considered to be 
one of the most dangerous and organized terrorist networks with some of the best business skills 
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when it comes to their funding and financial matters. The Haqqanis have flown under the radar 
for quite some time which has allowed them to engage in many different legal and illegal 
business ventures to fund their organization and execute terroristic operations.
16 In 2002 
documents seized from one of the Haqqani networks showed that the network relied mostly on 
the Pakistan's Intelligence Agency (ISI) for cash and supplies for the majority of the 1990s.
17 The 
Haqqani's have expanded and diversified the ways that they receive funding over the years. The 
network has been found to be involved in real-estate, construction, and even run their own 
businesses which double as a cover to launder money earned from criminal activity that they 
partake in. When it comes to gaining profit through illegal methods the Haqqani Network besides 
engaging in money laundering, they also use kidnapping and extortion of different businesses to 
earn funds. They have also been known to engage in charging to protect and assist in smuggling 
operations, which includes human smuggling and the transportation of narcotics and precursor 
chemicals used to make illegal narcotics.
18 The precursor chemicals are hidden through legitimate 
businesses, such as hiding behind the face of hospitals and medical centers for medicinal 
purposes. This illegal activity relies on the fact that Haqqani leaders are 
minor stakeholder owners of the medical centers and hospitals taking part in the illegal 
transportation of precursor chemicals.
19
 
 The structure and hierarchy of the Haqqani Network is small but efficient. Started by 
Jalaluddin Haqqani, the network is now controlled by his sons and made up of only twelve 
players who hold leadership positions.
20
 Jalauddin started early building close relationships with 
political, military, and local business community to establish supportive ties to the network that 
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has assisted the organization financially over the years. Looking at the history of the group prior 
to 2005, when Jalaluddin retired as leader of the network and passed it on to his sons, Sirrajuddin 
and Badruddin, reports show that most of the network's sources of income were through 
legitimate means. The Haqqani Network uses real-estate ventures, gives out small loans, as well 
as operates its own businesses to gain profit. After 2005 to diversify and hide their economic 
patterns, Haqqani's sons have engaged the organization in various criminal activities as another 
source of profit along with the legitimate businesses they were previously involved in. This illicit 
activity shows how the network relies on the relationships they formed with political and military 
leaders to have protection while engaging in illegal activity for profit. 
 Another reason the Haqqani Network has been financially successful is because of its 
meticulous record keeping of funds.
21 Documents show that not only is the group careful and 
particular with spending, but they keep record of every receipt, payment, and transaction ever 
made on behalf of the network. Although this is a great method to keep their finances in order, it 
can also be a vulnerability to the group because it reveals their financial cycle; where their money 
is coming from and where it is going.  In a 2012 report on Haqqani Network Financing, Gretchen 
Peters suggest that because of the Haqqani Network's size and recording methods, they can easily 
run into cash flow issues, but they also know how to work with very little funding and are experts 
at adapting themselves to work with whatever resources they may have. The Haqqani Network 
use what leverage they have with the State of Pakistan along with their ties to Al Qaeda and the 
Taliban to continue their growing and successful operations. 
 The Haqqani Network has been compared to the Italian Mafia because they are a small 
network that utilizes political relationships and crime to gain resources.
22 Just recently added in 
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2012, to the United States State Department list of Terrorist Organizations, this group is unique 
because its strengths also double as its weaknesses. Their records help reveal their financial 
trends and patterns, but because they are extremely diversified when it comes to gaining financial 
profit, it is difficult to identify all of their operations, additional connections and resources 
alongside other unknown means they may or may not be involved in.
23
As counterterrorism 
efforts have moved to cut off resources and finances of terrorist organizations, it is important to 
review the Haqqani Network's financial model and even more importantly see how they use both 
licit and illicit methods to their advantage to be successful. Understanding the financial patterns 
and operation of small terrorist organizations, such as the skilled Haqqani Network, will open up 
many possibilities for American national security officials and policymakers to identify similar 
patterns within other terrorist organizations.  
 
Al Qaeda 
 Like the smaller Haqqani Network, Al Qaeda and its affiliates are considered to be one of 
the most intelligent Terrorist organizations when it comes to fundraising and financing their 
operations. Al Qaeda has been known to use both licit and illicit methods to finance their 
operations. Al Qaeda has been found over the years to hide, move, and gain a profit using 
charitable organizations and mosques to mask funds.
24 Al Qaeda is also expert at gaining funds 
and sympathetic support from those who believe in their religious cause and purpose.  A Council 
on Foreign Relations study showed that individuals and charities in Saudi Arabia were main 
donors of monetary support to Al Qaeda.
25
 Al Qaeda relied on many Imams (head of the 
Mosque) to receive tithing funds from the congregation, known as Zakat. These Imams were able 
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to convince members of the mosque that these funds were going to a justifiable cause.
26 It is 
believed that terrorist organizations that use charities to either hide funds or to gain profit, 
penetrate the charity and convince those from the inside to contribute to their cause, or they 
establish the charity to use as a cover for money laundering purposes.
27 Also Al Qaeda receives 
funding from volunteers, many who would come from Saudi Arabia, who will bring money to 
pay for their own training at Al Qaeda camps and because these volunteers believe that they are 
contributing to a worthy cause and justifiable purpose.
28
 
 Branches of Al Qaeda, such as Al Qaeda Iraq and Al Qaeda Arabian Peninsula, have also 
hidden funds and gained profit through semi-legitimate companies such as import and export 
businesses and even banks. For example, a United States based member of Al Qaeda, Wadi Al-
Hage, used the Darkazanili Import-Export Company based in Hamburg, Germany as a business 
cover to hide his identity and funds before assisting in the 1998 bombings in East Africa. An 
example of banks assisting in terrorist financing and hiding funds includes the Dubai Islamic 
Bank in the United Arab Emirates. Once it was discovered that the Dubai Islamic Bank was 
connected to Al Qaeda, the bank was shut down within the United States. Al Taqwa was another 
bank that was assisting both Al Qaeda and the Palestinian terrorist organization, Hamas, in 
moving funds used for operations.
29
 
 When it comes to organized criminal activity there has been debate among scholars and 
analysts that Al Qaeda engages in specific organized criminal activities such as drug trafficking 
and the conflict diamond trade ring in Africa.
30 Many branches of Al Qaeda have also been 
                                                          
26
 Victor Comras, "Al Qaeda Finances and Funding to Affiliated Groups," Terrorism Financing and State 
Responses: A Comparative Perspective, ed. Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas (Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 2007), 116, 
27
 Ibid 83, 
28
 Ibid 10, 
29
 Harmon 85,  
30





known to rely on kidnapping for ransom and human smuggling.
31 Al Qaeda members in Iraq are 
infamously known for kidnapping hostages for large amounts of ransom money. Some of these 
ransom fees would range from US $50,000 to $600,000.
32 These same members engaged in the 
criminal activity of the theft and smuggling of oil from the Bayji Oil Refinery, where they would 
siphon the oil into trucks and then sell the oil on the black market. Al Qaeda Iraq was thought to 
make almost $2 Million a month off of stolen oil.
33
 Al Qaeda, as of 2007, in Iraq began to rely on 
car theft as a main source of financing. They would set up fake checkpoints dressed as police 
officers, seize the car, change the license plate and then resell the vehicle. Iraqi Al Qaeda 
affiliates would also engage in contraband smuggling as a large resource to gain income.
34
 
 Because Al Qaeda is such a complex organization, it is difficult to track many of the 
methods they use for funding and it is possible that Al Qaeda does not partake in drug trafficking 
as much as other organizations as they have many other lucrative business skills.
35 The problems 
that arise when attempting to mitigate Al Qaeda's financial structure arise from the organization's 
fundraising methods as movement of these funds are difficult to track because they are extremely 
diverse and they tend to move small amounts that are hidden very carefully, sometimes moving 
by engaging in the Hawalla System of Tradition Funds Transfer System (TFTS) that will be 
addressed later in this chapter.
36 Al Qaeda is a prime example of a large terrorist organization that 
is religiously and, as some would argue, sometimes politically motivated terrorist organizations 
that operates on many different levels to finance their operations. Al Qaeda is one of the most 
closely watched terrorist organizations as they present one of the largest threats to the western 
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world. It is important to understand their financial model and methods of funding since they have 
been successful in carrying out violent attacks and engage in different and advanced, and many 
times extremely violent, forms of criminal activity to gain financial resources. 
 
Other Networks 
 Although Al Qaeda, the Haqqani network, and other Taliban Terrorists organizations are 
important to understand when it comes to funding, it is also important to look at other networks 
both large and small. Many terrorist organizations that prove to be threats to the United States 
and other parts of the world may not have the size to use legitimate businesses and organizations 
to gain profit and hide funds like larger organizations have the ability to do. It is also important 
to understand that many terrorist organizations work hand-in-hand together with other terrorist 
organizations. As such the smaller organizations tend to model themselves after larger 
organizations such as Al Qaeda, and some even engage with organized crime organizations that 
may not be considered or classified as a terrorist organization, such as the relationship between 
Hezbollah and Mexican drug cartels.  
 The National Liberation Army (ELN) of Colombia is a small organization but is business 
savvy when it comes to funding and running their operations. The ELN was designated a 
communist or socialist motivated terrorist organization by the United States in 2005. Recovered 
disks found within a safe house used by the National Liberation Army (ELN), revealed that the 
ELN was a wealthy organization. On the discovered disks, there was information that mapped 
out exactly how much money was being obtained from extortion, theft and robberies, and from 
drug trafficking. This group is less wealthy than the larger communist terrorist organization, The 





legitimate corporations and the larger and wealthier FARC ranked 23rd.
37 This shows that these 
organizations work together and engage in similar activity and methods when it comes to 
financial trends and funding their organizations. 
 Various terrorist organizations have been known to buy and sell self-produced counterfeit 
goods such as clothing, handbags, and even tobacco products. Major groups have been caught 
producing and selling counterfeit goods within the United States and then placing the money 
raised on these counterfeit items back within their organizations.
38 The Lebanese based 
organization, Hezbollah, has been known to raise funds through the reproduction of designer 
clothing and the resale of counterfeit tobacco products, usually cigarettes, taking advantage in 
selling tobacco without paying the state tax prior to sale.
39
 
 Many terrorist organizations and networks even rely on robbery and hostage taking. The 
Irish Republic Army (IRA), an old organized crime ring considered to be a terrorist organization 
in the United Kingdom
40
, has been known to raise funds through robbery and hostage taking; 
they are also experts at extorting local businesses to fund their organization. Similar to hostage 
taking, kidnapping is a popular method to raise funds among most terrorist organizations.
41 
Kidnapping is a favorite means of funding among Latin American terrorist organizations just as it 
is with Al Qaeda and the Haqqani Network. Groups such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
(AQIM), Al Shabaab, and Boko Haram-- all affiliates with Al Qaeda engage in kidnapping for 
ransom as it is easy way to earn a large amount of cash. Many times they receive support from 
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regional organizations to gain weapons used in the kidnappings and to conduct the 
kidnappings.
42
  Kidnappings not only have the potential to ensue fear of the organization to 
prove that they are capable of harm and violence, but also allow the organizations to carefully 
target wealthy families for the best ransom transaction that will benefit the organization. 
 Another favorite method among many terror organizations is the illicit activity of drug 
production and sales for profit as it brings in large amounts of income. In the late 1990s, the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) became more reliant on drug production and 
trafficking for profitable income to run their operations.
43
In 2002 the United States Congress 
discovered that the FARC and ELN of Colombia were making a profit of at least $2 million 
dollars a day from drug production and trafficking of Cocaine.
44 Hezbollah has also been 
suspected of engaging in drug production and trafficking as a source of income. Not only is 
Hezbollah involved in trafficking Cocaine and other narcotics throughout the Mediterranean,
45
 
but also there has been much concern voiced by United States officials that Hezbollah is in 
business with and has ties to major Mexican drug cartels. This raises concerns that not only a is 
there a presence of Hezbollah members operating in the United States’ neighboring country of 
Mexico, but that Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations can take advantage of the  drug 
trafficking routes and possibly use the routes to not only smuggle drugs, but also people, into the 
United States.
46
   
 Other organizations earn profit from the support of Diasporas, or communities of natives 
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who have relocated or colonized outside of their native homes. The Sri Lankan Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam (Tigers of Tamil, or LTTE) turned gaining support from Diasporas of Tamil 
communities in both Canada and Great Britain into a profit-making business by charging 
members of these communities for taking part in cultural and social organizations as well as 
Tamil media outlets.
47 Tamil Diasporas within North America, Europe, and India have been 
known to provide the LTTE with money, weapons, and shelter. The Canadian Diaspora has been 
known to provide the Tamil Tigers with monetary support. Although the Tamil Tigers still 
receive some support from the different Diasporas, peace talks of the early 1990s caused the 
LTTE to shift their main resource of funding to legitimate business ventures that offered a more 
stable form of income.
48
  
 Similar to Al Qaeda and the LTTE receiving support from Tamil community members, 
the Palestinian Hamas organization funds its operations from the support of individuals, but their 
main resource was through charitable organizations. Hamas banks on the perception to many 
Palestinians’ that they are an organization that is charitable in areas where the Palestinian 
government has failed. Hamas has also been successful in gaining income through charitable 
associations and organizations, also known as Dawa activity, within Europe and the United 
States. Although some of the Dawa funds are used for humanitarian aid, it is impossible to 
separate what amounts are used for aid and what amounts go to terrorist activity.
49
 
Traditional Funds Transfer System (Hawalla) 
 Another important factor to look at is how terrorist organizations take advantage of 
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completely legal processes and use them illegally such as Hawalla, or the Traditional Funds 
Transfer System (TFTS), which is the old way of banking throughout Asia and African society, 
meaning bill of exchange "transfer," or promissory note in Arabic.
50 People within these 
countries use a third party businessperson or Hallawandar, to make transactions to avoid high 
banking fees and to expedite the process of transferring funds. Although this is a traditional 
method of banking for many people who want to make legal business transactions, it became an 
alarming concern to United States officials and those trying to combat terrorism that many 
terrorist and criminal organizations were able to move funds and conduct business by using the 
Hawalla process. The use of the Hawalla process is a safe method that terrorist organizations can 
move money and partake in business, moving funds quickly, making it nearly impossible to trace 
funds and business transactions moved through TFTS. 
 On November 14, 2001, the United States Senate held a hearing that addressed concerns 
that terrorist organizations were using TFTS as an "underground pipeline" to transfer terrorist 
network funds. Hawalla was used as a way to transfer the funds used to execute the terrorist 
attacks on United States soil on September 11, 2001. Understanding how terrorists were funding 
their actions became a high priority in counterterrorism efforts following the attacks of 
September 11, 2001. United Sates Congress addressed the issue that the use of the Hawalla fund 
transfer system could be used to transfer illicit funds used to fund terrorism or even mask funds 
by using the system to launder money. In 1994, the United States Congress made a strong effort 
to regulate the TFTS by drafting a legislative amendment to the Banking Secrecy Act (BSA) of 
1970, that would require all informal financial entities doing business with the United States to 
register with the government, however the regulations for this law remained unpublished, 
allowing Hawalladars (the Hawalla operator and person who facilitates the transfer and informal 
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51 to continue to legally operate and do business within the United States 
without supervision.
52 However, after the Patriot Act was passed in 2001, new regulations under 
Title III of the act (also known as the International Money Laundering Abatement and Financial 
Anti-Terrorism Act) amended the Banking Secrecy Act and other financial laws used to prevent 
money laundering and other white-collar criminal activity.
53 Other countries have made the 
TFTS process completely illegal. These countries are concerned that the Hawalla process has not 
only played a huge role in terrorist financing, but also appeals to criminals across the board, as it 
is difficult to trace movement of funds.
54
 
 It is important to understand the Hawalla or Traditional Fund Transfer System and to see 
what role the system plays in terrorist financing. It is extremely beneficial to understand trends of 
terrorist financing and how organizations are financing themselves and moving the funds whether 
gained  through  licit  or  illicit  means  and  seeing  how  terrorist  organizations  have   used              
legal systems for malicious purposes. The TFTS has been around for hundreds of years and what 
was once a convenient method for anyone to move funds and avoid the high costs of banks and 
move funds fast. Terrorist organizations have taken the system and have manipulated it to serve 
as a function that helps launder money and move profit gained by illegal methods. This shows 
that terrorist organizations are willing to use any method to achieve their goals and are willing to 
partake in both illegal and legal activities to gain resources as well as abuse legal systems by 
tailoring them to meet their financial needs. 
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Conclusion: The Future of Terrorist Financing 
 It is evident that terrorist organizations are creative and diverse when it comes to using 
different methods in gaining and maintaining profit to fund terrorist operations. Although many 
terrorist organizations are extremely diverse from each other when it comes to size, goals, and 
motives, most engage in both licit and illicit methods to fund their networks and operations. Each 
terrorist organization tailors their methods based on their individual resources and needs. For 
example, Al Qaeda does not engage in drug trafficking to earn profit, but the FARC and ELN of 
Colombia use drug trafficking as a main resource of funding. The rapid expansion of 
globalization over the last couple of decades has allowed terrorist to engage themselves in 
different transnational business ventures both legal and illegal. 
 There is no doubt that the majority of terrorist organizations have more than one method 
of fund raising for their organization. The majority of terrorist organizations partake in one or 
more type of criminal activity to raise funds and as a means to gather resources. Much of this 
activity is difficult to track and if they are caught, they have the opportunity to move on to a 
different method for profitable financial intake. Globalization and the constant changing and 
evolutionary world of technology allow terrorist organizations to take advantage of different 
business ventures and even engage in fraud and cyber criminal activity. Many terrorist 
organizations have already moved to computer hacking as a source of financing. As technology 
keeps evolving, concerns have risen that terrorist organizations will use cyber crime such as 
credit-card fraud and even phishing schemes as a way to gain profit to fund operations.
55
 
As terrorist organizations began to be self-sufficient they have all moved to using a number of 
diversified methods as means to gain funds and maintain their financial networks to sustain 
themselves and carry out their operations. Understanding how terrorist organizations fund 
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themselves and move their funds is pertinent to evaluate how terrorist organizations are using 
diversified criminal activity as a main method to gain resources and even recruit members. 
Although there are many laws and policies that address criminal activity and terrorism, the 
question then becomes, are current laws and policies addressing the threats that present 
themselves when terrorist organizations use criminal activity to achieve their goals? Should 
counterterrorism efforts be focused on deterring terrorist criminal activity? Criminal activity 
serves as a way to earn profit and even as a diversion for terrorist organizations to use to cover 
their terroristic activities and operations.
56 This overview of terrorist funding reveals how 
terrorist organizations benefit from criminal activity and even turn completely legal processes 
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A Look at Terrorist Financing Through Criminal Activity: Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas 
 Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, United States counterterrorism efforts 
have been made to gather intelligence regarding how terrorist organizations ultimately fund their 
activities in hopes of cutting off the flow of financial resources to debilitate these groups and 
keep them from successfully reaching their violent goals.
1 Terrorist organizations present many 
different threats to U.S. National Security. These organizations cannot operate without financial 
means. The following terrorist organizations are creative when it comes to funding their 
networks and actions, and receive support through licit and illicit financing. Although 
organizations in the past were predominately state sponsored, organizations are moving into their 
own business ventures, and depending more on criminal activity to gain, hide, and move funds. 
The criminal activity itself could be considered a threat, but just how dependent are terrorist 
organizations on criminal activity when it comes to funding? It is important to note that the 
United States considers all acts and links to terrorism a crime, but this study defines criminal 
activity as acts of traditional organized crime, such as theft or kidnapping, or white collar crimes 
dealing with money laundering and illegal businesses, not the acts or operations of terror 
themselves. Ultimately, cutting off illegitimate resources to these organizations would inhibit 
their overall operations and activities as they heavily rely on criminal activity as a main resource 
of funding. 
 To better understand the level of dependency terrorist organizations have on criminal 
activity, it is important to look at the amount of reliability major groups such as Al Qaeda, 
Hezbollah, and Hamas are on licit and illicit forms of funding through researching their methods 
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of how they finance their operations and delve deeper into finding what crimes, if any, contribute 
to funding and to what extent. As a result of the conclusion of the Cold War, research has shown 
that terrorist organizations have moved away from being predominantly state funded and have 
moved to self-sufficient ways to finance their operations.
2 There are a number of benefits that 
contribute significantly to the reason why terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, 
and Hamas have moved to different methods for funding. However, the most important is that it 
is more difficult for their financial patterns and operations to be traced. 
 Although Al Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah have all gained profit from legitimate 
businesses, after several major terrorist attacks on the west in the early 2000s, counterterrorism 
efforts were expanded to seek out organizations and learn the ins and outs of what allowed a 
group to be successful and continue to thrive. This exposed organizations using legitimate means 
to finance themselves. This included the exploitation of charities set up to gain donations for 
their cause and those receiving state funds. Because legitimate businesses are easier to trace, Al 
Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah have moved away from legal methods of funding such as state 
sponsorship and legitimate businesses and charities, and have increasingly moved to criminal 
activity as a main resource of income and funding. This becomes problematic for national 
security efforts as crime inherently presents threats and risks to public safety in general, but these 
crimes are contributing to funding the ultimate act of terror. 
 It is no mystery that Al Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah all engage in criminal activity to 
fund and sustain their operations, however there are different views of why these organizations 
partake in particular crimes and how much they actually rely on criminal activity as a resource. 
Almost in all cases when it comes to terrorist funding, state sponsorship of terrorist organizations 












 Al Qaeda funding comes mostly through the infiltration of charities and sympathetic 
islamists as sponsors through donations, or through the tithing process known as Zakat.
4 Studies 
show that Pre-9/11 resources could have come from Osama Bin Laden himself, that the 
organization set-up their own businesses, that Al Qaeda was and is potentially engaged in the 
African Conflict Diamond trade, that they were funded by foreign governments sympathetic to 
their cause, and that they were involved in international drug trade. Victor Comras makes the 
claim that it is currently challenging to prove what other resources and means contribute to Al 
Qaeda's financial infrastructure and how much funding actually comes from other sources, such 
as criminal activity. However, because Al Qaeda operates in small and local geographical cells, 
they most likely rely heavily on criminal activity financing to remain covert, and to quickly move 
and hide funds.  
 The overthrow of the Taliban and Al Qaeda base camps in Afghanistan caused Al Qaeda 
to splinter into local cells that operate autonomously. The Taliban and Al Qaeda are responsible 
for their own fundraising. This raises another challenge as these groups are harder to track 
because they rely on locals for donations, internet solicitation, petty crime, and drug trade for 
financial resources.
5 Mark Basile explains that Al Qaeda's Operational Doctrine actually calls for 
these cells to financially function autonomously so their funding operations and activities are 
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harder to track down.
6 Michael Scheuer also explains that part of Osama Bin Laden's "business 
plan" for Al Qaeda was to "build and strengthen" the autonomous sectors, or "off-shoots", of Al 
Qaeda and diversifying funds is one way to do so.
7 Juan Miguel del Cid Gómez, reiterates 
Scheuer's main point of how Al Qaeda's financial network functions by explaining how Al Qaeda 
has used white collar crime such as moving funds through charitable organizations and through 
illegitimate businesses as a ploy to hide funds and protect their financial infrastructure. Al Qaeda 
then takes advantage of the Hawalla (traditional funds transfer system), which uses a third party 
individual to move and safe keep funds. This completely legal process is used to launder money 
earned to finance the organization.
8 Al Qaeda's funding patterns and trends are difficult to detect 
because they have gotten better at hiding their financial patterns, which is an attribute of the use 
of criminal activity. It will take collaboration of private sector groups and the intelligence 
community to better track and mitigate Al Qaeda's funding mechanism.
9
 
 Phil Williams’ work highlights Al Qaeda's criminal activity in Iraq. Al Qaeda in Iraq has 
been found to engage in criminal activity such as kidnapping, oil theft and smuggling, fraud, and 
even on occasion automobile theft.
10 Williams claims that Al Qaeda in Iraq receives some 
amount of funding from criminal activity. Again, it is challenging to find out just how much 
funding is coming from the illicit activities since much of the activity is covert.
11 A U.S. 
Government intelligence estimate released in 2006 claimed that Al Qaeda Iraq was making 
between $70 million to $200 million a year from criminal activity alone and they were able to 
                                                          
6
 Mark Basile, "Going to the Source: Why Al Qaeda’s Financial," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 27: 169-185, 
(2004), 
7




 Juan Miguel del cid Gómez, "A Financial Profile on Terrorism of Al-Qaeda and its Affiliates," Perspectives on 
Terrorism, 4, no. 4 (2010): 3-27, 
10







sustain themselves on funding from criminal activities.
12 Williams is more hesitant and reluctant 
to make the claim that Al Qaeda Iraq depends on criminal activity as a main resource of funding 
as they still depend on donations from volunteers and benefactors. 
 Like Al Qaeda Iraq, Al Qaeda Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), funds itself by merging state 
sponsored funds and criminal activity to fund their organization. It was reported in 2010, that 
Saudi Arabia was providing financial support to AQAP and that they too were engaging in other 
criminal activity like their counterparts Al Qaeda Iraq.
13
 Other Al Qaeda affiliates such as the 
Somalian group Al Shabaab and the Algerian group, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), 
also received mixed funding from state and private sponsors, as well as engage in piracy, 
kidnapping, human trafficking and drug trafficking.
14
  Modeling their financial mechanisms after 
their larger affiliate has allowed these groups to fund themselves and carry out operations. Like 
the other organizations highlighted, a move from state and local government sponsors have 
encouraged groups to diversify their financial models and engage in more criminal activity and a 
main resource of funding. 
 
Hezbollah and Hamas 
 Hezbollah's funding is unique because they are partially state-sponsor funded through the 
Iranian government.
15 Iran gives Hezbollah monetary aid yearly. However, trends show 
Hezbollah has moved from depending solely on Iranian government funds to depending on 
diasporas in Latin America and through the engagement of criminal activity.
16 Like Al Qaeda, 
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Hezbollah and Hamas receive funds through charitable organizations.
17 Jennifer Hesterman 
suggests that Hezbollah engages in criminal activity in Latin American countries to be closer to 
the west and to build coalitions with major Latin organized crime groups.
18 Through growing 
partnerships with these organized crime groups and often drug cartels, Hezbollah has taken 
advantage of international drug trafficking, the drug routes themselves for human smuggling and 
trafficking, and additional trade-offs by working with these organizations.
19
 
 According to Michael P. Arena, other criminal resources Hezbollah taps into are the 
production and sale of counterfeit goods. One major example of this is the production and sale of 
counterfeit produced cigarettes within the United States.
20 Hezbollah has also been found to 
engage in intellectual property crime.
21 Nathan Vardi claims that Hezbollah is able to diversify 
their funds through different criminal activities.
22 Hezbollah is less dependent on Iran for funding 




 The Hamas terrorist organization has been known to use white collar crime to launder 
money through charitable organizations and businesses, including banking institutions to earn 
and hide funds.
24 Like Hezbollah, Hamas has a heavy presence and ties to Latin America and 
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Latin American criminal organizations.
25  Hamas has also depended on its ties to Iran for 
financial support. In July of 2012, due to political disputes, Iran began reducing the amount of 
funding it was contributing to the Hamas terrorist organization.
26 Although a Congressional 
Research Service report reveals that Iran and Hamas are mending their relationship, Hamas could 




 Most research conducted on terrorist financing shows that funding has shifted from state 
sponsorship to more autonomous means of funding, many of them using methods that are illegal 
and considered criminal activity. Joshua Alexander Geltzer claims many Islamic terrorist 
organizations do both, but there are advantages and disadvantages to both state-sponsored 
terrorism, which he deems as "nationalization," and autonomous funding, which he deems as 
"privatization."
28 Geltzer's main argument suggests neither "privatization" funding nor 
"nationalization" funding is better than the other; it is relative to a terrorist organizations need to 
either enhance their constituency through state-sponsorship, or need to drive their agenda by 
autonomous funding.
29  He also makes a key point that groups that are "privately funded" and 
lack consistency of funds, which means terrorist organizations that engage in criminal activity 
most likely receive funding from other sources.
30 While this may be true, it is also important to 
note it allows terrorist organizations to sustain themselves if a state decides to cut off funding to 
an organization. As the United States has identified government leaders involved in funding 
terrorism, government sponsors have progressively moved away from funding organizations, 
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forcing groups self-fund to move their financial models underground.
31
 
Another claim that Michael Jacobson makes is how the use of the internet has allowed terrorist 
organizations to solicit funds and rally support. Some of this internet activity is completely legal, 
while other internet activity has been maliciously used to commit crime and fraud to steal for 
profit and launder money.
32  The access to the internet has allowed various organizations to 
expand licit and illicit business ventures.
33
 Michael Jacobson claims that Al Qaeda, Hamas, and 
Hezbollah have all utilized the internet as a mode of fundraising. According to Michael Scheuer, 
Iraq has allowed Al Qaeda to engage in the use of the internet to "practice, refine, and teach," 
new methods, which has also been a resource for funding and recruiting new members.
34
 
Expansion of technology and internet use has opened up the global market and has also allowed 
financial crime, as well as other crimes, to be as easy as a click of a button. This has offered 
terrorists a new tool to commit crime for funding purposes. 
 The lack of data on terrorist organizations' use of criminal activity makes it difficult to 
weigh how dependent each organization is on criminal activity as a source of funding. However 
Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Hamas all engage in criminal activity to earn funds and diversify their 
financial model to sustain their networks and better hide their financial patterns and overall 
activities. Because each of these organizations is considered to be a major threat to the west, they 
have broken off into autonomous groups to better hide themselves and to remain active; the 
benefits of the organizations financing their operations and goals using underground, illicit 
activity outweigh more open methods of funding. 
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Methodology and Approach 
 By reviewing through careful analysis how the Al Qaeda and Hezbollah organizations 
depend on a specific major criminal activity as a way to fund their operations, it will paint a 
clearer picture of how counter-terrorism efforts can be focused on going after the criminal 
activity as a way to cut off financing and ultimately inhibit and deter these organizations' 
operations overall. Note that these organizations also use other organized criminal activity 
mentioned through this study as a resource of funding, but this chapter focuses on two specific 
areas of crime that each organization is heavily dependent on for funding: The illicit drug trade 
and production and the illicit sale of legal goods. These particular instances show to what extent 
Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Hamas and even other organizations that present a threat to the west 
engage in these organized criminal activities to rely on funding and that these organizations are 
skilled and organized criminals, using crime to keep their organizations financed to achieve 
bigger goals. 
 
Al Qaeda the Taliban's Involvement in Illicit Drug Trade 
 Drug trafficking is one of the most successful, illicit methods used to earn profit, 
allowing them to have fast and ready cash for operations. The market for illegal drugs is huge, as 
drug use is an international problem. In 2013 Afghanistan remained the largest producer of illicit 
opium at 296,720 hectares, which is about 733,211 acres of land worth of opium.
35 The early 
1990s saw a shift in where vast amounts of opium were being produced. Originally most opiates 
were grown and produced in the "Golden Triangle," (Myanmar, Laos, and Thailand) but the 
majority of the product was now coming from the "Golden Crescent" (Pakistan, Afghanistan, 
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36 According to the United Nations Crime and Drug report from 2013, this was a 36 
percent increase of production since 2012. In the aftermath of the U.S. attacks on 9/11, 
counterterrorism efforts were blindingly focused on going after the Taliban and Al Qaeda with a 
militaristic approach to combat the organizations. It was not until 2003, when the American 
Navy found a submarine filled with $3 million dollars’ worth of heroin guarded by two men that 
were wanted for being affiliated with Al Qaeda, that the U.S. really believed that Al Qaeda and 
the Taliban were using the lucrative opiate production as a major resource for the organization.
37 
A few months following this incident, U.S. agents raided a drug smugglers' hideout in Kabul and 
found a satellite phone that had called a number of suspected terror cells in Western Europe, 
Turkey, and the Balkans. After further investigation, U.S. officials found more links between 
terrorist organizations and narcotics traffickers throughout Afghanistan and Pakistan.
38
 
 The Taliban, without doubt, are heavily involved and infiltrated within the growth 
production and trafficking of opium and heroin. They also tax farmers an ashr tax, which is a 
type of religious tax that profits the organization.
39  Al Qaeda was accused of being involved in 
the drug trade. Al Qaeda leadership denied involvement of trafficking drug; however, it is the 
lower level autonomous members of Al Qaeda that were found to be involved in drug running 
and protecting drugs for profit.
40
 Like instances where state sponsors backed away from 
financially sponsoring terrorist groups, the hierarchal make-up of Al Qaeda, allows leadership to 
deny the organization's involvement in drug trafficking. It is highly likely leadership encouraged 
members to engage in drug trafficking but denied involvement when low level men were caught 
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participating in illicit drug trade. Al Qaeda also takes advantage of sharing drug routes with drug 
trafficking organizations within the Golden Crescent region.
41 Not only has Al Qaeda been found 
running opiates within the Golden Crescent regions, but they have also profited off smuggling 
Cocaine from Latin America to Europe.
42 In a sense these organizations are religiously against 
using drugs as it is against Islam, but they have found a loophole in the process, justifying the 
earning of profit from drug trafficking and the trafficking of opiates as contributing to their 
greater cause of creating a pure Islamic world. 
 The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) estimates that opium provides the Taliban 70 
percent of its financing.
43 It is more difficult to estimate how much drug trafficking contributes to 
Al Qaeda, because they are involved at lower levels and deny engaging in drug production, trade 
and trafficking at the hierarchal levels. However it is known that Al Qaeda does engage in drug 
trafficking and many low level Al Qaeda insurgents "have learned to live off drug money."
44 
Also, the organization is able to earn funding for their own actions and sustain as the cost of to 
commit an act of terror is relatively low. For example, the 2004 Madrid bombing only cost the 
men $70, 000 and 191 people lost their lives.
45 The men who carried out the bomb plot in Madrid 




 According to an interview conducted by Gretchen Peters, DEA has reason to believe as 
of 2007, eighteen of forty-two Department of State designated terrorist groups had ties and were 


















benefitting from drug trafficking.
47 In 2008, Michael Braun of the DEA said that like the FARC, 
Hezbollah, and Hamas, Al Qaeda was becoming more engaged in drug trafficking as a resource 
for financing. Another reason Al Qaeda began to increasingly engage in drug trafficking was 
their partnership and protection from the Taliban fighters.
48 The increased growth production of 
opium and seizures of opiates and Heroin show that criminal organizations within regions 
populated by the Taliban and Al Qaeda are continuously partaking in the illicit drug trade. The 
Taliban's tax on opium poppy farmers shows that they are still taking advantage of the funding as 
all but 20 percent of their finances come from illegal drug production and trade. Although it is 
more difficult to trace how much funding contributed to Al Qaeda's financing model, it is safe to 
say by what little we know from the case of the U.S. Navy finding Al Qaeda members running 
drugs via submarine, and the drug-funded bombing of Madrid, that they are benefitting from 
drug trafficking as resource to finance and sustain the organizations existence and operations. 
Hezbollah's Smuggling of Cigarettes 
 Hezbollah is skilled at using different criminal activities and money laundering to fund 
their organization. They are extremely successful at manufacturing and selling counterfeit goods. 
Hezbollah has been found to be involved in a number of criminal activities that has spanned 
across the continental U.S.
49 One of Hezbollah's most profitable criminal schemes that reaped 
large amounts of money was a lucrative cigarette smuggling scheme that profited the 
organization approximately $8 million U.S. dollars.
50 According to a Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) Bulletin, what investigators thought was just some Lebanese criminal ring 
was actually something much bigger. 














 In 1992, Mohamed Youssef Hammoud came to New York on a fraudulent visa. The FBI 
began to investigate Hammoud and found that he and his relatives had ties to the Hezbollah 
terrorist organization. During FBI’s investigation of Hammoud and his network, it was learned 
that he and others were actively engaged in criminal activity as a fundraisers for Hezbollah. FBI 
Special Agent Shwein, who investigated this case, stated that the cell members were "part-time 
terrorists and fulltime criminals."
51 These criminals were being directed by Hezbollah, who was 
gaining profit on the illicit activities taking place on U.S. soil. 
 In 1994, while working an off duty uniformed job at a convenience store, a North 
Carolina Detective, Robert Fromme, noticed a group of Middle Easterners walk into a 
convenience store he was patrolling with grocery bags filled with $20,000 to $30,000 dollars in 
cash. They used the cash to purchase a significant amount of cigarettes. This behavior raised a 
red flag and Detective Fromme began documenting how often this was occurring. On average 
the men would purchase 1,000 to 4,500 cartons of cigarettes during one purchase and the 
occurrence was an almost daily transaction. After contacting the Charlotte Division of the 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), they informed Fromme that he may be 
witnessing a "Cigarette Diversion Ring," where individuals take advantage of the state tax by 
purchasing the cigarettes where tax on tobacco is low and would then transport the cigarettes to 
states where the tobacco tax is much higher. Further joint investigation efforts by the ATF, FBI, 
and Department of State revealed that the group in North Carolina was meeting weekly with 
Hammoud to watch videos produced by Hezbollah, donate money to Hezbollah, and learn how 
to perfect the art of criminal activities, such as credit card and immigration fraud, and even learn 
the cigarette smuggling routes. In 2002 the North Carolina Cigarette Smuggling Cell was 
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indicted in a joint investigative operation called "Operation Smokescreen." The indictments were 
possible because the investigation revealed that money from the criminal activity was being 
laundered and financing Hezbollah.
52
 The cell members were making payments through 
Canadian based Hezbollah middle- man, Said Harb.
53 Precursor crimes, such as fraudulent 
marriages to obtain visas, were committed by the cell in the early 1990s to obtain access into the 
United States, although some of the members were married and had spouses in Lebanon, they 
convinced and engaged their "fake" spouses to take part in the cigarette smuggling ring.
54   Said 
Harb even bribed officials at the U.S. Embassy in Nicosia, Cypress and paid Americans to marry 
his family members.
55 The marriages were an illegal tactic used by the group to remain in the 
United States.; the cell was committing all sorts of crime to achieve their main goal of running the 
cigarette smuggling ring to earn revenue for Hezbollah.
56
 
 The cell's ongoing operation and organization shows the cell maintained an organized 
criminal mechanism that had many components and intricacies that were executed almost 
flawlessly, "the purchase, transportation, storage, and distribution of the cigarettes involved 
multiple levels of deception."
57 The operation would begin in North Carolina where a cell 
member would purchase the bulk cigarettes using a Shell company account or an alias. They 
would then store the cigarettes in rented storage space in either North Carolina where the 
purchase would take place, or Michigan, where the sales were taking place. Then members or 
recruits would transport the cigarettes using mini vans. The mini vans could make multiple trips a 
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day and could carry loads worth up to $13,000 per van.
58 The cell also got creative by hiring 
American women to drive rented vehicles that were disguised as the average American tourist 




 To make the purchases and remain covert, cell members used different credit cards to 
purchase the cigarettes and pay the transport and storage expenses, to keep the transactions 
separate and difficult to link.
60 Payments for the cigarettes were wired to accounts owned by the 
members of the cell under aliases.
61 One noted wire transfer of $17,000 from Hussein Chahrour 
to Mohamad Hammoud as a payment for contraband cigarettes.
62 Another instance shows that a 
customer in Michigan wired almost $500,000 to Hammoud, which was then made its way to two 
separate bank accounts in Charlotte, North Carolina.
63 With the money from the ring, the cell 
members laundered the money by opening tobacco store used to sell the smuggled cigarettes and 
by taking the money and opening up other businesses or through investments.
64
 
The operation would have probably sustained longer if Detective Fromme had never noticed the 
group of men at the store he was working as an off duty assignment. If he had not witnessed the 
odd transaction and notified other government agencies, it is likely that it would have taken more 
time to connect all the pieces together and tie the group from North Carolina to the Hezbollah 
terrorist organization. According to Shelley and Melzer's study, terrorist organizations still make 
profit off of cigarette smuggling as U.S. law enforcement has done little to focus on the issue.
65  
What this case shows is that terrorist networks are taking advantage of globalization and an open 





















trade market, through partaking in illegal trafficking of a completely legal product. Since most 
use autonomous cells to sustain the organization, it is easier to hide from the public, whether that 
be the United States, or their home country to execute different crimes that bring in funding. The 
case of Hezbollah shows how complex and organized terrorist organizations are as they move to 
criminal activity as a main resource. In the case of the North Carolinian Hezbollah cell, the 
operation lasted the time span of just over ten years, and brought in millions of dollars. 
 
Challenges to Combat Terrorism through Crime Fighting 
 The case studies reveal not only the issues of terrorist organizations using crime to 
finance operations, but show that there is a transnational drug use problem. Combating the crime 
could be a short term solution, but until the issue of drug abuse is addressed people will continue 
to purchase illicit drugs which may be contributing to terrorist organizations using drug 
trafficking as a resource. To counter the problem in the United States, the White House has kept 
drug-use prevention at the top of its list to counter the drug problem and lower the consumption 
of illegal drugs within America, in hopes of slowing down and mitigating illicit drug trafficking 
operations.
66 This would most likely affect terrorist organizations linked to Latin American drug 
rings, and even the drug rings and trafficking operations within the Golden Crescent. This also 
shows that as long as there is a market for illicit goods criminals will take advantage of selling 
coveted items to earn a profit. This is how many terrorist organizations are involved in illegally 
selling drugs, arms and weapons, counterfeit goods, or as we saw in the case study on Hezbollah 
and the cigarette smuggling operation, even legal goods sold on a black market. 
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Findings and Conclusions 
 From the analysis of the case studies it is clear that the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and Hezbollah 
are financed through illicit activities. Also, as stated earlier in this study, other organizations 
partake in illegal activities, as globalization allows an open market that terrorist groups have the 
ability to take advantage of to earn profit. These groups engage in diverse criminal activities, but 
the case studies reveal how skilled these organizations are by highlighting specific activities that 
the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and Hezbollah have executed that reaped great financial benefits. 
After review the studies show that terrorist organizations are becoming skilled and organized 
criminals. This also reveals how terrorist organizations operate and can work autonomously at 
lower levels to earn money and sustain the group to contribute to their organization's radical 
goals. 
 When it comes to level of dependency each organization has on criminal activity as a 
main financial resource, we cannot determine hard numbers of how much money comes from 
illicit funding due to the covert action of criminal activity and anonymity of terrorist 
organizations. We can see from the case studies of those caught committing crimes, such as 
Hezbollah smuggling cigarettes and the men caught trafficking drugs, and reviewing reports of 
production and seizure of opiate production and trafficking and surveys taken within the Golden 
Crescent region linking farmers to paying production tax to the Taliban, that terrorist 
organizations are surviving on criminal activity as a main resource of funding. The analysis of 
literature and case studies show that even those organizations receiving state sponsored funds and 
private donations are looking for more undercover and fast ways to finance their actions and 
operations through a variety of criminal activities. 





Middle East. According to Gretchen Peters, Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, had 
concerns that going after these drug trafficking rings would be a costly and ongoing battle, 
similar to the drug issue in Colombia.
67 It was then left to law enforcement to combat the issue. 
Peter's view argues that if the military had assisted law enforcement efforts in the Middle East 
drug trafficking fight, it could have had a huge impact in the war on terrorism.
68 Today, law 
enforcement and intelligence experts do see the transnational criminal and terrorism nexus as a 
major issue. Many experts believe that counterterrorism efforts should be focused on mitigating 
and preventing the crimes that terrorist organizations are partaking in for funding. This method 
would serve as a major blow to terrorists financial mechanisms, which would ultimately inhibit 
the organizations ability to operate and possibly prevent the organizations from being successful 
and possibly even bring them to their end. Money sustains terrorist organizations, so stopping the 
cash flow would ultimately bring these groups to their demise. 
 This chapter shows that terrorists rely mostly on illicit activities as a main financial 
resource. Clearly the U.S. government, the intelligence community, and law enforcement see this 
as an issue, not only is the crime a threat to American people, but it is a national security  threat  
as it is funding organizations that have a vendetta with the democratic west. According to 
Michael Braun from the DEA, terrorism is expensive to maintain, and these groups are "part time 
terrorists and full time criminals."
69 The criminal, terrorism nexus has caught the attention of 
U.S. policymakers and officials as a problem that needs to be addressed, however, in some cases 
such as the Hezbollah Cigarette smuggling ring case, a whole-of government approach was 
 successful and can prevent the problem and slow down terrorist financing. On the other hand, 
looking at the situation of drug trafficking in Afghanistan, the military refused to get involved 











and left it to agencies such as DEA, with little bandwidth to resolve an extremely complex 
situation, that is still unresolved. Also, policymakers and government task forces address the 
issue of stopping terrorist funding; they have had many successes but still face the difficult issue 
of connecting criminal activity to organizations and stopping the flow of cash. The third and final 
chapter of this study will review and analyze the effectiveness of U.S. policies and 
counterterrorism efforts to address the illicit funding of terrorist organizations. Terrorist 
organizations thrive and survive on funding, if their financial resources are cut off, they cannot 





















Overcoming Obstacles:  The Need to Establish a Whole-Of-Government Approach 
 Evidence from chapters one and two of this study reveal that terrorist financing through 
criminal activity presents numerous obstacles that U.S. policymakers and agencies tasked with 
protecting U.S. interests from the many dangers of terrorism must work together to overcome.. 
Although there are many existing policies focused on disrupting the funding and the flow of 
funds to terrorist organizations, there are gaps that need to be addressed.  Specifically, gaps 
remain in coalescing various government entities into a whole-of-government approach to 
address the terrorist financing threats achieved through criminal activity. An ideal whole of 
government approach is one that establishes a shared mission that combines strengths and 
resources to deploy counterterrorism efforts but not encroach on each agencies traditions and 
overall operations. 
  One major hurdle that the U.S. government must address in terms of a whole- of -
government approach to fight terrorist financing, is to see past what will be defined in this study 
as organizational culture differences. Organizational cultural differences is defined by the 
internal makeup of an organization where traditional roles and responsibilities have been 
established over time by each individual government agency and department. According to 
James Q. Wilson, many factors within bureaucratic U.S. government agencies provide 
organizational cultural differences that can prevent coordination efforts when establishing a 
whole-of-government strategy.
1
 Wilson refers to internal goals that are established by executives, 
tradition of the organization, and the background and experiences that make up an organization.
2
 
These organizational differences, at many times with policy, prevent a whole of  government 
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approach because of what agencies and departments have been trained to handle, what policy 
allows them to handle, resource and bandwidth constraints, as well as legal hurdles that prevent 
and slow counterterrorism efforts to fight and prevent terrorist financing through criminal 
activity. 
 This chapter of this study will evaluate and analyze current policy and the current state of 
a whole of government approach to fighting terrorist financing by evaluating the organizational 
culture differences and the lack of resources and support agencies within the U.S. government 
encounter while being tasked with slowing down and preventing terrorist financing. Analyzing 
the issues U.S. agencies and policymakers face will provide clarity and guidance on how and 
where the United States should focus efforts and resources to combat terrorist criminal activity 
and financing. Further analysis will assist in providing policy recommendations on how the 
United States should make changes to current policy and counterterrorism efforts when it comes 
to establishing supportive policy, dedicating resources, and defining roles and responsibilities in 
a whole of government approach that will allow the United States to combat terrorism through 
eliminating terrorism by cutting off the financial flow to terrorist organizations.   
 There is a clear nexus between transnational crime and terrorism, especially when it 
comes to financing operations and recruitment methods. In 2011, the White House's National 
Security Council established a "Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime." This 
strategy lays out a plan that calls for interagency collaboration to tackle transnational criminal 
organizations that present threats to U.S. interests and national security. Although on paper the 
strategy eludes to the idea that interagency collaboration will help stop transnational crime, like 
other policy it lacks the consideration of finite resources and stove piping that each government 





congressional budgetary backing. 
 
Policy: The Bank Secrecy Act and Title III of the PATRIOT ACT 
 In the 1970s Congress saw a need to pass the Bank Secrecy Act or Anti-Money 
Laundering Act, to better trace funds that could possibly be laundered finances used for criminal 
activity, by requiring "U.S. financial institutions to keep records of cash purchase of negotiable 
instruments, file reports of cash transactions exceeding $10,000 (daily aggregate amount), and to 
report suspicious activity that might signify money laundering, tax evasion, or other criminal 
activities."
3 The Bank Secrecy Act serves as the basis to other U.S. policies that assist is tracking 
and stopping terrorist financing. 
 In October 2001, U.S. Congress passed the Patriot Act of 2001 to fight terrorism 
following the terrorist attacks on U.S. soil on September 11, 2001. Title III of the Patriot Act, 
also known as the International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act 
of 2001, amended the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 and specifically laid out how U.S. Financial 
institutions and agencies should fight terrorist financing through requiring the filing of suspicious 
activity reports (SARs) to the U.S. Department of Treasury's FinCEN , requiring U.S. institutions 
to establish internal policies and programs that train employees on what to look for and how to 
report suspicious activity to the FinCEN.
4
 
 Title III, Section 314 also calls for cooperation from law enforcement authorities, 
regulatory agencies, and financial institutions. Section 314 encourages information sharing 
among financial institutions and appropriate government entities to allow each agency and law 
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enforcement to conduct investigations and ultimately trace funds back to the people associated 
with numerous terrorist organizations. The act also required financial institutions to verify new 
customers and check them against a list of known and suspected terrorists. Although this part of 
the act, is not a heavy lift for banks, as banks are required to have this information on their 
customers, the raised concerns with privacy advocates, as customers do not have to be notified 
that their information may be reported to the FinCEN.
5 This part of Title III has not seemed to 
present issues to the U.S. government in the fight against terrorist financing. Other issues with 
the policy is the concern of FinCEN providing guidance on how financial institutions should 
implement their internal policies. As all financial intuitions are different, it difficult to give 
specific guidelines and implement regulations across the board to all U.S. financial institutions 
that may come across suspicious activity linked to terrorist operations.
6 Although this assist 
private companies and institutions from too much government oversight, it can present a 
challenge to the Department of Treasury when it comes to establishing metrics of reporting to 
congress to receive legislative backing and funding of programs and initiatives to fight terrorism 
through tracking and inhibiting terrorist financing through money laundering and banking 
activity. 
 Overall, U.S. policies and legislation in place are loosely tailored to allow companies and 
agencies to operate without many restrictions, but there are many areas in the whole of 
government approach where there is a lack of congruent policy that would require all agencies to 
be accountable when addressing some of the illicit methods terrorist organizations use to finance 
their operations and carry out acts of terrorism. However, it is a challenge to make policy when in 
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many instances it is extremely difficult to pinpoint whose viewpoint or reasoning behind acting 
or not acting, will be more beneficial to the overall fight against terrorism. This issue of 
organization cultural differences will be addressed throughout this chapter. Also, Title III's 
requirements help track and flag money laundering crimes, but there is no guarantee that it will 
actually help much in tracing funds linked to terrorist organizations. In some ways Title III may 





Treasury: The Terrorist Finance Tracking Program & Financial Crimes Enforcement 
Network 
 After September 11, 2001, the United States Department of Treasury established a 
Terrorist Finance Tracking program (TFTP) to “identify, track, and pursue terrorists...and their 
networks."127 The U.S. Department of Treasury program works to "identify, pursue, and track 
terrorists-such as Al-Qaida- and their networks."
8 According through the TFTP, the program "has 
provided thousands of valuable leads to U.S. Government agencies and other governments that 
have aided in the prevention or investigation of many of the most visible and violent terrorist 
attacks and attempted attacks of the past decade." Under the TFTP program, the U.S. Treasury 
Department issues subpoenas to the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial 
Telecommunication (SWIFT), a Belgium-based coalition of major central banks that include the 
U.S. Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, and 
the lead overseer, the National Bank of Belgium that operates a worldwide messaging system 
used to transmit financial transaction information, to obtain information on suspected 










international terrorists or their networks.  Under the terms of the subpoenas, the U.S. 
Government may only review information as part of specific terrorism investigations. In 2009, 
SWIFT stopped storing certain sets of these critical data on its U.S. servers and hosts those data 
sets in the European Union (E.U.). As a result, the U.S. negotiated an agreement with the E.U. on 
the processing and transfer of this information to the U.S. Treasury Department that became 
effective in 2010. Based on information that identifies an individual or entity, the U.S. 
Government is able to conduct targeted searches against the limited subset of records provided by 
SWIFT in order to trace financial transactions related to suspect terrorist activity. SWIFT 
information assists the U.S. government in mapping out terrorist networks, and many times has 
filled in missing links in an investigative chain.  The U.S. Government can act on the 
information gathered by the TFTP. When necessary, for counter-terrorism purposes, the TFTP 
shares leads generated by the TFTP with relevant governments’ counter-terrorism 
authorities.
9 According to the TFTP, by following the money, the TFTP has allowed the United 
States and our allies to identify and locate operatives and their financiers, chart terrorist networks, 
and help keep money out of their hands.
10
 
 The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), is an arm of the U.S. Treasury 
Department and falls under the Treasury Under Secretary of Terrorism and Financial 
Intelligence.
11 FinCEN's mission "is to safeguard the financial system from illicit use and combat 
money laundering and promote national security through the collection, analysis, and 
dissemination of financial intelligence and strategic use of financial authorities."
12 FinCEN 
collects, maintains, analyzes and disseminates financial data to law enforcement when action is 
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needed. FinCEN is also the lead U.S. government organization that has authority to regulate 
banks and financial intuitions to ensure they are compliant with the Bank Secrecy Act and Title 
III of the Patriot Act, which requires financial institutions to establish an internal anti-money 
laundering program and report information that is important when law enforcement and 
regulatory agencies are conducting investigations related to financial criminal cases, tax cases, 
and regulatory investigations and proceedings, and certain financial intelligence and counter- 
terrorism matters. The Director of FinCEN has the authority to implement, administer, and 
enforce compliance of the Bank Secrecy Act and other regulations in regards to anti-money 
laundering laws.
13 By the policy and legislation in place and the nature of the U.S. Department of 
Treasury, it seems that the Department of Treasury has the most authority and relationships and 
coalitions in place to receive information from U.S. Financial Institutions and share information 
with other intelligence community and law enforcement agencies when it comes money 
laundering and suspicious banking activity related to terrorist financing. 
 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation: Terrorist Finance Operations Section (TFOS) 
 Title III of the PATRIOT Act encouraged the establishment of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation's (FBI) Terrorist Finance Operations Section (TFOS). Prior to September 11, 2001, 
the FBI did not have a centrally focused and proactive approach to addressing terrorist financing. 
As a result, in the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, the FBI director made combating 
terrorism the top priority of the FBI and with that the FBI saw a need to establish TFOS. The 
mission of TFOS has expanded from its inception, to "identify, investigate, disrupt and dismantle 
incrementally, all terrorist-related financial and fund-raising activities.
14
" TFOS "coordinates 









efforts to track down terrorist financing and to exploit financial information in an effort to 
identify previously unknown terrorist cells, and to recognize potential activity and planning."
15 
Similar to FinCEN, FBI's TFOS conducts "full financial analysis of terrorist suspects and their 
financial support systems."
16 By working with other government agencies, international law 
enforcement, the private sector, and regulatory agencies, the TFOS develops predictive models 
and analytical products that help identify unknown terrorist suspects.
17 According to a 
congressional testimony given by the FBI Assistant Director of the Counterterrorism Division 
John S. Pistole in 2003, TFOS, "is both an operational and coordinating entity with pro-active 
and reactive responsibilities. As a coordinating entity, the TFOS is responsible for ensuring that a 
unified approach is pursued in investigating terrorist financing networks. The TFOS achieves this 
directive by: 1) coordinating the financial aspects of FBI Field Office and Legal Attaché (Legat) 
terrorism investigations; 2) establishing overall initiatives, policy and guidance on terrorist 
financing matters; 3) participating in the National Security Council's Policy Coordinating 
Committee (PCC) on Terrorist Financing; 4) coordinating national liaison with the financial 
services sector; 5) cooperating in and coordinating criminal terrorist financing investigations with 
the Department of Justice; and 6) providing support and training to Field Offices to include the 
designated Terrorism Financing Coordinator (TFC) ."
18 The FBI's TFOS, like the other U.S. 
Government agencies, plays an important role in fighting terrorist financing and after a close 
look at their mission, execution of their operations, and their coordination efforts show that they 

















like the other agencies that will be highlighted in this chapter, operate in their own way, 
specialize in specific investigation efforts, and although carrying out their own mission they also 
contribute to the U.S. government's shared goals of tackling terrorism through the disruption of 
terrorist financing. 
 
The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) & The Department of Defense 
 The DEA, although not directly tasked with handling financial crimes and investigations, 
does play a large role in the fight against terrorist financing.  As seen in chapter two of this study, 
illegal drug production and trafficking has strong ties to certain terrorist organizations and 
substantial amounts of illegal drug money is greatly contributing to terrorist training, recruitment, 
and operations. The DEA's overall mission includes bringing to "criminal and civil justice system 
of the United States, or any other competent jurisdiction, those organizations and principal 
members of organizations, involved in the growing, manufacturing, or distribution of controlled 
substances appearing in or destined for illicit traffic in the United States...
19
" which includes, "the 
seizure and forfeiture of assets derived from, traceable to, or intended to be used for illicit drug 
trafficking; Coordination and cooperation with federal, state and local law enforcement officials 
on mutual drug enforcement efforts and enhancement of such efforts through exploitation of 
potential interstate and international investigations beyond local or limited federal jurisdictions 
and resources; Coordination and cooperation with federal, state, and local agencies, and with 
foreign governments, in programs designed to reduce the availability of illicit abuse-type drugs 
on the United States market through non-enforcement methods such as crop eradication, crop 
substitution, and training of foreign officials; Responsibility, under the policy guidance of the 
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Secretary of State and U.S. Ambassadors, for all programs associated with drug law enforcement 
counterparts in foreign countries; Liaison with the United Nations, Interpol, and other 
organizations on matters relating to international drug control programs." 
 The mission of the DEA portrays their role in fighting terrorist financing. As a law 
enforcement agency tasked with tracking and fighting illicit drug production and trafficking, the 
DEA has become a vital asset through operations and working closely with military and other 
government agencies in the Middle East, Latin America, and domestically to fight terrorism 
being funded heavily by the growth and production of opiates. According to Peters' work, the 
Pentagon was hesitant to take on the drug problem in Afghanistan because U.S. commanders 
feared that the mission of addressing the drug problem would conflict with counterinsurgency 
efforts to "win over hearts and minds" in the countryside where the Taliban was active. Also, 
opium makes up 30 to 50 percent of Afghanistan's GDP, and other locals profit from opiate 
production, not just those with ties to the Taliban. Another issue is the Central Intelligence Agency 
and U.S. military worked with human sources that were often heavily involved in drug 
trafficking and in many cases, the intelligence value of the relationship with the source 
outweighed their involvement in illegal drug trafficking operations.
20
 
 In 2006 two policymakers, Congressmen Hyde, Chairman of the House Committee on 
Foreign affairs,  and Congressman Kirk also a member of the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs,  saw a need for policy that addressed both "the drugs and related terror 
simultaneously."
21 In 2006, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld quarantined the two issues; 
the insurgency in Afghanistan as a Military problem and the opium trade and production was a 
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problem that law enforcement should handle.
22  Although a policy and operation that addressed 
both issues was what the two congressmen were strongly pushing for in Afghanistan, U.S. 
military would rarely intercept or address the drug problem when they came across the 
production and movement of opium and would reject the DEA's request to provide backup to 
their missions.
23
 The Congressmen pushed the Pentagon to implement a plan that would "merge 
the military's counter insurgency mission with that of the DEA's drug-fighting mission."
24 The 
Pentagon's response stated that Great Britain was the "lead nation on narcotics issues within the 
coalition."
25
 According to the Pentagon the U.S. supported the British counter narcotics initiative, 
but the liaison between the 
 United States and Great Britain was the U.S. State Department. The Pentagon's response 
at the time exposed organizational cultural differences through the difference in attitudes among 
leadership in the DEA and the DoD that did not encourage an active whole-of-government 
approach to tackling the drug problem in Afghanistan that was undoubtedly contributing to the 
Afghani insurgency and terrorist operations. Another concern that arose, was the idea that 
individual American units deployed in Opium production areas had the potential to become 
corrupt if they were to get more involved in assisting and paying closer attention to the drug 
problem in the region. 
 A prior DEA Chief, Jack Lawn, stated "In the war environment, you don't get from point 
A to point B without military assistance."
26
According to Meyers, as cited by Gretchen Peters, a 
congressional study revealed that in 2005, the DEA requested military airlifts to conduct 
operations on twenty-six occasions and were denied twenty-three times. However in 2006, the 















Pentagon accommodated twelve of fourteen air support requests from the DEA.
27
 Other issues 
included a lax policy within the military that did not enforce officers to command their units to 
intercept or address drug issues they were encountering in Afghanistan and no directive or 
guidance to work with and support the DEA.
28  To add to the problem, some military officials 
denied there was a link between the drug trade and the Taliban. By 2004 the United States could 
see that the linkage between the drug trade and the Taliban and even other terrorist 
organizations, and this became an issue. By that point the United States had left it up to Great 
Britain to handle the problem and Great Britain did not have extraterritorial drug laws and the 
DEA had to prove that the drugs were making it into the United States to be able to make a case 
in Afghanistan.
29
 The mission in Afghanistan was the same, but differing views of how to 
approach the problem married with the lack of resources (DEA in this case) and training (U.S. 
Military) caused a divide in the United States' efforts to stop terrorism funding through the 
production and trafficking of drugs, it even affected the relationship with foreign allies and the 
international approach to tackle the issue. 
 In 2008, the DEA's Assistant Administrator and Chief of Operations, Michael Braun in 
his address to the Washington Policy Institute, explained the importance of addressing the illegal 
drug trade in the Middle East and Latin America that has ties to foreign terrorist organizations 
(FTOs). Not only do these terrorist organizations benefit from transnational crime that present 
other threats to U.S. interests, but these groups also share traits that are similar to those that 
global drug cartels possess; the major difference is the motivation behind the crime that will 
determine the use of the funds. Over the last thirty-five years the DEA not only expanded 
internal efforts to combat trade of illegal drugs in by operating sixty three countries, but has 











made efforts to work closely with the Department of Defense to address the drug problem 
in the Middle East that the illicit profits are funding terrorist training and operations. After years 
of working with the Department of Defense through briefing DoD leadership, Braun explained 
that the DoD "lacks the organizational infrastructure and know-how to attack terrorist and 
insurgent groups that are engaged in global drug trafficking."
30
 Braun's statement is an example 
of how different organizations have various roles and responsibilities, strengths, capabilities, and 
approaches when it comes to combating terrorism and terrorist financing. Braun's statement 
aligned with the DEA's goals and mission, but it may not have aligned with the DoD's goals at 
the time. Many times groups have to work together toward an overall mission. For example, the 
different branches of the military often work together in the same mission space, but although the 
military may share a mission, members of organizations will "defend and advance the interests of 
their parent organization when placed in an inter-organizational setting."
31
 Although on face, 
these situations such as the DEA working with the military to combat illegal drug funding 
funneling into terrorism operation, in many ways encourages collaboration and sharing of 
capabilities it can also serve cause strife and polarization between U.S. government agencies and 
organizations when it comes to a whole-of-government and collaborative approach when 
implementing U.S. counterterrorism efforts and policy. 
 It's clear by looking at a few of the U.S. Government organizations that contribute to the 
fight against terrorism, that each has their own mission, but many times their missions overlap or 
conflict with other agencies missions and views of what is best to fight terrorism, as seen in the 
example of the DEA and U.S. Military in the Middle East when addressing the drug trade 
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contributing to terrorism. Also, each have legal limitations and specific authorities in the fight 
against terrorism financing as delegated by U.S. policy and legislation. This presents other 
challenges to agencies when faced with implementing operations in stopping terrorist financing. 
Many times when agencies are not in direct contact with each other, efforts are duplicated, which 
is problematic when fighting terrorism, as it takes up time and resources vital to operations. 
 Legal and authority limitations make it difficult at times to apprehend issues that are 
affecting the United States when abroad.
32 Also, when organization cultural differences, differing 
strengths, and views clash on counterterrorism and operational matters (especially within 
leadership and with U.S. policymakers), it is difficult to effectively fight terrorist financing 
collectively. Ultimately U.S. government agencies must work together and utilize their strengths 
and ensure they are communicating and have a mutual understanding to fight terrorist financing 
efforts. 
 
Current Challenges to the U.S. Government in Combating Terrorist Financing 
 In addition to internal interagency obstacles that must be overcome to have a true whole- 
of-government approach to countering terrorist financing, in the past year Islamic State in Iraq 
and the Levant (ISIS) have presented a new terrorist threat to the United States., U.S. interests, 
and allies. According to a Financial Action Task Force report, ISIS, like other terrorist 
organizations, use diversified methods to finance their operations. There have been instances of 
the organizations' involvement in oil smuggling and trafficking, kidnapping and extortion, and 
other methods similar to those seen in chapter one of this study.
33 According to the report ISIS, 











constantly changes their methods of financing through illicit methods which presents its own 
challenges but the organization, is also different in the way they use social media platforms as a 
means of crowd source funding and in the way they use social media and encourage and recruit 
individuals to act as lone wolf terrorists, using whatever they have on hand to act out an act of 
terrorism.
34
According to J.M. Berger, ISIS's use of their social media strategy “employs social-
media strategies that inflate and control its message. Extremists of all stripes are 
 
increasingly using social media to recruit, radicalize, and raise funds, and ISIS is one of the most 
adept practitioners of this approach."
35 Chart 1, shows ISIS's use of tweets sent in just over a 
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two-hour period. The chart shows how active the group is on twitter and this does not include 
other social media platforms that the group uses to message members and potential members for 




 ISIS presents a whole slew of problems to the U.S. government when it comes to 
counterterrorism problems. Another issue ISIS presents, is their large presence in numerous 
countries around the world and like Al-Qaeda networks, many individuals are self-funding their 
own training, actions, and participation in ISIL, which adds to the problem of the U.S. 
government tracking down funds feeding into ISIS and ISIL operations.
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 Overall there are many policies and U.S. government efforts in place to combat terrorism 
through institutional requirements and monitoring to trace and prevent the flow of funds linked to 
terrorism and terrorist organizations. As seen by this study there are a number of internal issues 
and the problems within the current state of terrorism must have to be addressed to form a true 
whole of government approach that is the most efficient when fighting terrorism and establishing 
counterterrorism efforts that with help eliminate terrorism against U.S. people and interests, 
through tracing and stopping illicit terrorist financing. 
 To overcome these obstacles, the U.S. government agency leaders, department heads, and 
policymakers must take a close look at each agency that plays a role in the fight against terrorist 
financing and better understand each organization's mission and strengths. Also it is important to 
understand the internal make-up of each agency and not only their strengths, but their 
weaknesses and interests. Along with the evaluation of each organization's culture and mission 
space, it is important to note conflicting views before establishing operations where interagency 









teams must work together to avoid the potential of holding up operations and missions. It is vital 
that the agencies support each other and work together to quickly execute missions in fighting 
terrorist financing. It is necessary to also see what limitations there are to each agencies 
jurisdiction and how that fits in their own mission and areas of responsibilities as well as how 
those limitations can encroach upon executing counterterrorism efforts that protect the U.S. and 
U.S. interests from terrorist attacks. If there are policies in place that slow down counterterrorism 
efforts and operations, then they should be reevaluated and amended to allow each organization 
to utilize their strengths and capabilities in the fight against terrorist financing. 
 Policymakers should also take a close look at current policy and see what limitations 
prevent the U.S. Government from being able to fully protect U.S. interests and are burdensome 
on financial institutions or inefficient in tracing and stopping terrorist financing. With that 
policymakers should consider establishing policy of authoritative orders that requires agencies to 
communicate and better share information with one another to avoid duplicate efforts and 
missions, and to ensure that all agencies address and acknowledge all issues that are tied to 
terrorist financing. With that this policy must not encroach internal operations or fuse many 
departments into one. In the case of the Military in Afghanistan, a lack of policy allowed the 
military to ignore requests from the DEA to address the drug problem in the Middle East until a 
year after the DEA and policymakers stressed continuously to the DoD that the drug problem 
had larger implications then just being an illegal drug problem and was fueling terrorism.
38 
When considering implementing a true whole of government approach by establishing policies 
and requirements to offer the U.S. government guidance, it is important to do so to allow each 
agency to do its job, but should try to address the gaps that have prevented lost successes in the 
past when fighting terrorism. 







 Although a cookie-cutter whole-of-government response to fighting terrorism is ideal, the 
organizational cultural and mission differences, difference of opinions amongst the agencies and 
policymakers, as well as policy gaps prevent such a plan to exist. However, better understanding 
of each U.S. government player and their roles, mission, and views can assist in establishing 
policy and counterterrorism efforts that can better fight terrorist financing contributing to 
organizations that present huge threats to U.S. people and interests. Evaluating current policy and 
considering new policy will also help form a better whole of government strategy to tackle 
terrorist financing, especially if the policy considers each organization and financial institutions 
involved. Also, with the current rise of ISIS  and their use of social media for crowd source 
funding and call for members and supporters to commit acts of lone wolf terrorism, it 
may be best for the U.S. government to dedicate more resources and experts in the fight against 
terrorist financing to evaluate the technological methods organizations can use as a resource and 
re-evaluate if the costs of terrorism is not what it used to be and more disparate than seen in other 
groups, since ISIS has been successful in executing attacks through lone wolfs who use their own 
money and resources to commit terrorism. Although their methods may change to adapt to 
current methods, financing is still important to their operations. A RAND report analysis 
suggested that policymakers and those in the U.S. Government should change their perspective 
and scope of terrorist financing to the term "terrorist economics" to expand the scope of thinking 
of the problem. I would agree with the analysis report. The problem is adaptive and should be 
looked at as a larger problem, not a singular mechanism and business model. Expanding this 





stronger counterterrorism to fight terrorist financing.
39
  
 There is no clear answer to solving the problem against terrorist financing, however as 
revealed by this chapter, it is important to consider a strong whole-of-government approach and 
if such an approach is possible for the U.S. government to work closely together to address 
differences that could potentially slow down the fight against terrorist financing. Policy or review 
should at the least be established to ensure that each agency has the resources and uses their 
strengths to go after terrorist financing. Ideally this would include information sharing and 
ensure that each groups operations do not get in the way of the other. Also, it is important to 
establish guidelines that allow each U.S. government entity involved in counterterrorism efforts 
to know when one mission may outweigh a short term operation (such as when intelligence value 
may provide more operational value than an arrest of a low-level drug trafficker.)  Although 
terrorists are adapting to new methods, as technology continues to rapidly expand, it is still vital 
to trace and stop terrorist organizations supply chain by tracing and stopping the flow of illicit 
funds. The U.S. government must evaluate and establish policy that equips the U.S. government 
with a shared mission and goal that is resilient and adaptable to the threats that terrorist financing 
presents to the United States. 
                                                          
39
 Benjamin Bahney, Howard J. Shatz, Carroll Ganier, et al., "An Economic Analysis of the Financial Records of al-







 This study has revealed that terrorist organizations partake in one or more type of 
criminal activity to raise funds and as a means to gather resources. Terrorist financial activity is 
difficult to track and if they are caught, they have the opportunity to move on to a different 
method for profitable financial intake. The fast spread of globalization and the speed and 
expansion of technology allows terrorist organizations to take advantage of different business 
ventures and even engage in fraud and cyber criminal activity. Terrorist organizations use a 
number of diversified methods as means to maintain sustain themselves and carry out their 
operations. 
 Understanding how terrorist organizations fund themselves and move their funds is 
pertinent to evaluate how terrorist organizations are using diversified criminal activity as a main 
method to gain resources and even recruit members. The first chapter of this study reveals how 
terrorist organizations benefit from criminal activity and even turn completely legal processes 
into illegal tools of terrorism, which is important when establishing policy and counterterrorism 
effort to address the problem. 
 From the analysis of the case studies in chapter 2, it is clear that the Taliban, Al Qaeda, 
and Hezbollah are financed through illicit activities. Also, as stated earlier in this study, other 
organizations take advantage of illegal activities to earn profit. These groups engage in diverse 
criminal activities, but the case studies reveal how skilled these organizations are by highlighting 
specific activities that the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and Hezbollah have executed that reaped great 
financial benefits. After review the studies show that terrorist organizations are becoming skilled 
and organized criminals. This also reveals how terrorist organizations operate and work 





organization's radical goals. 
 When it comes to level of dependency each organization is on criminal activity as a main 
financial resource, we cannot determine hard numbers of how much money comes from illicit 
funding due to the covert action of criminal activity and anonymity of terrorist organizations. We 
can however, see from the case studies of those caught committing crimes (such as Hezbollah 
smuggling cigarettes and the men caught trafficking drugs, and reviewing reports of production 
and seizure of opiate production and trafficking and surveys taken within the Golden Crescent 
region linking farmers to paying production tax to the Taliban), that terrorist organizations are 
surviving on criminal activity as a main resource of funding. The analysis in chapter 2 shows that 
organizations receiving state sponsored funds and private donations are looking for more 
undercover and fast ways to finance their actions and operations through a variety of criminal 
activities. 
 Prior to 9/11 the U.S. government did not see a need to go after drug traffickers in Middle 
Eastern regions. According to Gretchen Peters, Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, had 
concerns that going after these drug trafficking rings would be a costly and ongoing battle, 
similar to the drug issue in Colombia.
1 It was then left to law enforcement to combat the issue. 
Peter's view argues that if the military had assisted law enforcement efforts in the Middle East 
drug trafficking fight, it could have had a huge impact in the war on terrorism.
2 Today, law 
enforcement and intelligence experts do see the transnational criminal and terrorism nexus as a 
major issue. Many experts believe that counterterrorism efforts should be focused on mitigating 
and preventing the crimes that terrorist organizations are partaking in for funding. This method 
would serve as a major blow to terrorists’ financial mechanisms, which would ultimately inhibit 
                                                          
1
 Peters, Gretchen. "Seeds of Terror: How Heroin is Bankrolling the Taliban and Al Qaeda,"   (New York, New York: 







the organizations ability to operate and possibly prevent the organizations from being successful 
and possibly even bring them to their end. Money sustains terrorist organizations, so stopping the 
cash flow would ultimately bring these groups to their demise. 
 The criminal, terrorism nexus has caught the attention of U.S. policymakers and officials 
as a problem that needs to be addressed, however, in some cases such as the Hezbollah Cigarette 
smuggling ring case, a whole-of government approach is successful and can prevent the problem 
and slow down terrorist financing, on the other hand looking at the situation of drug trafficking in 
Afghanistan, the military refused to get involved and left it to agencies such as DEA, with little 
bandwidth to resolve an extremely complex situation, that is still unresolved. Also, policymakers 
and government task forces address the issue of stopping terrorist funding; they have had many 
successes but still face the difficult issue of connecting criminal activity to organizations and 
stopping the flow of cash. 
 Ultimately the U.S. lacks a strong whole-of government approach and mission with 
strong policy backing to address terrorist financing in a quicker and more efficient manner. U.S. 
government agency leaders, department heads, and policymakers must take a close look at each 
agency that plays a role in the fight against terrorist financing and better understand each 
organization's mission and strengths. Policymakers must also address the de-confliction of 
clashing views before interagency teams work together on missions to avoid inhibiting 
collaborative counterterrorism efforts. As seen in chapter two and three, agencies must support 
each other and work together to fighting terrorist financing. When establishing policy and 
counterterrorism efforts to fight terrorist financing, the U.S. government needs to be aware of the 
limitations each agency may have when it comes to jurisdiction and areas of responsibilities as 





the United States and U.S. interests from terrorist attacks. 
 Policymakers should consider establishing policy of authoritative orders that require 
agencies to communicate and better share information with one another to avoid duplicative 
efforts and missions and to ensure that all agencies address and acknowledge all issues that are 
tied to terrorist financing. When considering implementing a true whole-of-government approach 
by establishing policies and requirements to offer the U.S. government guidance, it is important 
to do so to allow each agency to do its job, but should try to address the gaps that have prevented 
lost successes in the past when fighting terrorism. 
 Understanding the problems presented by terrorist organizations and their finance models 
shows that funding through criminal activity is a problem, and presents a number of issues to the 
U.S. in the fight against terrorism. This study revealed that fighting terrorist financing can cut off 
flows of funding to violent organizations and assist in stopping terrorist organizations from being 
successful in carrying out acts of terrorism. Reviewing each U.S. government player and their 
roles, mission, and views will assist in establishing strong policy and counterterrorism efforts 
that can better fight terrorist financing. Evaluating current policy and considering new policy will 
also help form a better whole-of-government strategy that can overcome internal obstacles and 
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